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OF NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION
Compiled by
Todd S. Sechser
The Center for International Security and Cooperation, Stanford University
Key Insights:
•

U.S. policy toward the nuclearization of India and Pakistan has shifted from sanctions and rollback to
reluctant acceptance of their nuclear status. The United States now seeks to ensure that India and Pakistan become responsible nuclear powers and is emphasizing cooperative measures to prevent war, secure
weapons and material from terrorist theft, and stop the further spread of nuclear weapons.

•

Analyses of Indian and Pakistani nuclear behavior must consider the domestic political motivations of
key decisionmakers and not just national security interests.

•

Nuclear weapons in South Asia have both precipitated one limited war (Kargil 1999) and prevented
another (the 2001-02 crisis). The lessons learned from these events in New Delhi and Islamabad may be
dissimilar.

•

India and Pakistan might be willing to cooperate with the broader nuclear nonproliferation regime, even
if they cannot join the NPT as nuclear-weapons states. Such a step could be essential in bolstering efforts
to prevent illicit nuclear assistance to new proliferating nations.

•

The strategic effects of a potential Indian missile defense deployment are highly uncertain.

•

The United States, India, and Pakistan have mutual interests in preventing nuclear terrorism, which
could lead to deeper cooperation among the three countries.

On June 4-5, 2004, the Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC) at Stanford University hosted
a workshop on the question of nuclear weapons and stability in South Asia. The workshop, which brought together
approximately 75 scholars, military ofﬁcers, civilian policymakers, scientists, and journalists, was cosponsored by CISAC
and the U.S. Army War College.
In the 6 years since India and Pakistan conﬁrmed their membership in the nuclear club through a competitive round of
test explosions, the two nations have fought a bloody conﬂict in Kargil (1999), experienced a major military crisis (200102), and taken steps to clarify their nuclear doctrines. Moreover, since the 1998 tests, Pakistan has experienced a military
coup (1999) and uncovered a ring of illicit nuclear commerce within its own nuclear program (2004), while India has
survived a terrorist attack against its parliament (2001) and underwent a change of ruling parties (2004). This workshop
sought to identify the key lessons of this eventful period for scholars and policymakers.

Three basic questions motivated the workshop. First,
what can the experiences of India and Pakistan teach
us about the causes of nuclear proliferation? Second,
what effect have nuclear weapons had on Indo-Pakistani
behavior? Finally, what future direction can we expect the
South Asia nuclear relationship to take? To encourage frank
discussion, individual comments from the panels remain off
the record. A summary of the workshop’s major issues of
contention follows.

In any case, uncertainties plague our understanding of
Islamist positions on key nuclear questions. For example, it is
unclear whether the Jama’at is committed to sharing nuclear
weapons with other Muslim countries or simply defending
them, or whether it deems only Islamic countries worthy
of nuclear assistance. Finally, what is the position of the
Islamic extremist parties on Pakistan’s doctrine of nuclear
use? Some in the Jama’at may favor the use of nuclear
weapons to respond to a massive Indian conventional strike,
but others appear to favor nuclear use only as an in-kind
response. These uncertainties make it difﬁcult to predict
exactly how Pakistan’s nuclear policies would change if the
Jama’at or a similar party gained control of the government
in Islamabad. Undoubtedly, however, Pakistan’s nuclear
behavior would be more aggressive than is the case today.

Domestic Politics and the Causes of Nuclear
Proliferation.
The ﬁrst topic considered the drivers of Indian and
Pakistani nuclear behavior. Although security motivations
undoubtedly inﬂuenced each state’s decisions to research,
develop, and test nuclear weapons, it is likely that domestic
political incentives played a critical role in New Delhi’s and
Islamabad’s nuclear policies.
Indeed, one participant argued that India’s 1998 tests
were a direct consequence of a series of domestic factors,
including the ruling BJP’s desire to ward off hardliners,
heighten its future re-election prospects, bolster its position
among coalition government allies, and be seen as a
“promise-keeping” party.
While the tests left the opposition parties in disarray
and garnered deferential and generous media coverage,
they did not prevent the BJP from paying the political price
of a stagnant economy shortly afterward. In fact, some
participants noted that, while the tests at ﬁrst presented the
opposition Congress Party with the difﬁcult choice of either
supporting its rival or appearing unpatriotic, they may have
aided the opposition by ending the debate about testing and
shifting the political focus to “the price of onions.”
The discussion of Pakistan centered largely around the
inﬂuence of extremist Islamic parties such as the Jama’at-i
Islami in Pakistan’s nuclear behavior. On one hand, it is
clear that the Jama’at strongly favors hawkish nuclear
policies, and the party lobbied loudly for a Pakistani
response to India’s nuclear tests in 1998. Moreover, the
Jama’at views Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal as not merely a
national security instrument but a force to serve the broader
Muslim community worldwide. On the other hand, there
is little evidence to suggest that the Jama’at, while the
strongest Islamic party in Pakistan, holds any meaningful
sway over Pakistani politics. Indeed, some conference
participants took the view that the party’s small number
of parliamentary seats reﬂected low public support and
suggested that the party did not inﬂuence Prime Minister
Nawaz Sharif’s decision to match India’s nuclear tests in
1999.

The Consequences of Nuclear Weapons.
The 1999 war in Kargil marked the ﬁrst time two nuclear
powers fought a war directly against one another, killing
over 1,000 soldiers in the conﬂict. What are the implications
of Kargil for stability between India and Pakistan, and how
can deterrence be bolstered between the two states?
One view interprets the Kargil war as an illustration of
the “stability-instability paradox”―the idea that nuclear
weapons, while deterring outright nuclear war, may in fact
enable low-intensity conﬂict to thrive. Because neither
India nor Pakistan believe that the other will likely escalate
to nuclear use in response to low-level conventional
skirmishes, both feel free to conduct minor attacks. India’s
satisfaction with the status quo in Kashmir may preclude
it from launching these types of strikes in the future, but
Pakistan’s greater discontent may motivate it to exploit
the spectrum of low-intensity conﬂict made available by
nuclear weapons.
It is not clear, however, that Pakistani leaders continue to
hold this view of the Kargil affair. Indeed, it is quite possible
that the overpowering Indian conventional response to the
insurgents persuaded Pakistani elites that India could not be
cowed into accepting low-intensity revisions of the status
quo. Although the Musharraf government will not admit
that the Kargil adventure was a mistake, it has certainly
been more careful since 1999.
Debate also centered around the question of India’s
lessons from the crisis that followed the deadly attack on its
parliament in late 2001. India adopted a strategy of coercive
diplomacy during this crisis, making a variety of demands
and threatening to use force if they were not met. But
because India backed down when some of these demands
were not met suggests that nuclear weapons may have
deterred the use of military force rather than aided India’s
strategy of compellence.
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Two counterarguments to this claim were made.
First, while India and Pakistan indeed did not go to war
in 2002, they came very close―so close that an accident,
miscalculation, or small piece of misinformation might have
touched off a disastrous conﬂict. Moreover, in the future, a
vulnerable Indian regime might be forced to choose between
carrying out a dangerous threat or committing political
suicide by backing down. The BJP was able to withstand
the price of capitulating, but future regimes might not be (or
might not think they are).
Second, some argued that American intervention was
responsible for preventing war, not nuclear deterrence.
After being bailed out of the Kargil crisis by the United
States, Pakistani leaders may have come to believe that they
can count on the American escape hatch in future crises.
Yet it also could be the case that the war frightened them
into abandoning the view that escalation could be attempted
without consequence. Indeed, one conference participant
suggested provocatively that, even if one side were to use
a battleﬁeld nuclear weapon in a future conﬂict, the United
States might be better off if it did not intervene to end the
war immediately.
How might the destabilizing effects of nuclear weapons
in South Asia be mitigated? One participant argued that an
Indian missile defense system would lessen India’s fears of
being victimized by a nuclear ﬁrst-strike. Pakistan’s fear of
an Indian attack would then reduce Islamabad’s willingness
to use conventional or subconventional forces in Kashmir.
Moreover, this speaker argued that India could deter
Pakistani “misbehavior” by threatening a ﬁrst-strike.
But many participants objected strongly to this
reasoning, contending that the argument vastly
overestimated the effectiveness both of missile defense
itself and the reassurance that it would provide to India.
Moreover, Pakistan would be almost certain to acquire
a matching system, potentially offsetting its deterrent
value while also creating dangerous ﬁrst-strike incentives
for India in the predeployment period. The participants
concluded that deployment of Indian missile defense would
produce highly uncertain effects on strategic stability on the
subcontinent.

from the treaty, questionable nuclear activities by Iran,
and recent revelations of nuclear smuggling by Pakistani
scientist A. Q. Khan have undermined the integrity of the
nonproliferation regime. In addition, the U.S. refusal to ratify
the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) has frozen that
treaty before it could enter into force, as a number of nonnuclear states have argued that the United States must ratify
the CTBT as a symbol of its NPT commitment to work in
good faith toward disarmament.
Disagreement emerged, however, on the question of
possible Pakistani and Indian accession to the NPT and
CTBT. One panelist suggested that the two states might
be willing to sign the NPT if the regime permitted them
to join as legal nuclear-weapon states, perhaps in a onetime admittance of such members. In exchange, India
and Pakistan could agree to improved transparency of
their programs, strict controls on the export of nuclear
technology, and restrictions on the size of their arsenals.
A similar proposal envisions an Additional Protocol, or
“ﬁve plus three” arrangement that would give partial NPT
membership to India, Pakistan, and Israel in return for their
observance of some of the obligations borne by the treaty’s
nuclear-weapon states.
Some participants worried, however, that these
proposals missed the primary dangers confronted by the
NPT. First, although India and Pakistan could agree in
principle to control the transfer of nuclear technology to
outside parties, the A.Q. Khan saga illustrates that the
Pakistani government may not have the ability to enforce
such strict regulations. Second, it is no longer clear what
incentives the NPT bargain offers to non-nuclear states.
The attraction of civilian nuclear technology once ﬁlled this
role, but it has not proven to be the low-cost energy source
it had been thought to be. Additional security guarantees
may be needed to assure non-nuclear states that the NPT is
in their interest. Third, the perceived failure of the treaty’s
ﬁve nuclear-weapons states to make substantial progress
toward disarmament, as required by Article VI of the NPT,
has undermined the conﬁdence of some states that the treaty
is not detrimental to their security.
Does size of the American nuclear arsenal impact
proliferation decisions by other states? Some participants
advanced the argument that proliferation decisions are
based on regional security calculations, not evaluations of
U.S. adherence to an ambiguous legal obligation. But others
noted that the U.S. refusal to ratify the CTBT has often been
cited in Pakistan as a reason not to join other arms control
arrangements. Moreover, to the extent that the United States
is in fact a global power, its nuclear status may play directly
into the regional security calculations of potential nuclear
powers.

Nonproliferation and Arms Control.
Finally, the workshop turned to the question of
nonproliferation in South Asia, with panelists considering
advantages, drawbacks, prospects, and strategies for
extending the international nonproliferation regime to India
and Pakistan.
All agreed that the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)
is facing a serious crisis. The withdrawal of North Korea
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One participant built on this thread by asking how India
and Pakistan might react to a clause of the NPT that set a
time limit for nuclear disarmament but also included India
and Pakistan in that obligation. The workshop agreed that
neither state would be likely to accept such a proposal.

*****
The views expressed in this brief are those of the author and
do not necessarily reﬂect the ofﬁcial policy or position of
the Department of the Army, the Department of Defense, or
the U.S. Government. This conference brief is cleared for
public release; distribution is unlimited.

Uncertainties Behind; Possibilities Ahead.

*****

Two on-the-record talks rounded out the conference. In
the ﬁrst, David E. Sanger, White House correspondent for
the New York Times, reviewed our current understanding
of the A.Q. Khan nuclear smuggling network and its
implications. Mr. Sanger noted that while Libya’s
cooperation with Western investigators has revealed crucial
information about the network, the most important details
remain unknown. We know that Khan’s nuclear commerce
ring provided North Korea, Libya, and Iran with crucial
materials, and that intelligence shortcomings in the West –
aided by strategic decisions that minimized U.S. scrutiny of
Pakistani nuclear activities – allowed the network to expand
largely unnoticed. But we do not know the actual number
of nations that received nuclear weapons designs, the full
quantity and type of weapons that were exported, or even
whether the network has truly been broken. Perhaps most
important, we still do not know whether Gen. Musharraf
and the Pakistani military knowingly aided Dr. Khan in
his efforts to peddle nuclear technology across the globe.
Some suspect that Gen. Musharraf was complicit in an
effort to share the “Islamic bomb,” but others suspect that
central oversight of the Pakistani nuclear program was too
weak to catch Dr. Khan. Either possibility carries dangerous
implications.
Dr. Mitchell B. Reiss, Director of Policy Planning at the
U.S. Department of State, gave the second on-the-record
address. He took a forward-looking approach, detailing
efforts by the Bush administration to enlist India and
Pakistan in nonproliferation efforts. Speciﬁcally, Dr. Reiss
discussed two possibilities: ﬁrst, the integration of India and
Pakistan into the Proliferation Security Initiative, an effort
designed to intercept illicit shipments of nuclear material;
and second, placing civilian nuclear facilities under IAEA
safeguards. He concluded by imploring the two nations to
be mindful that “great power carries great responsibility,”
and expressed hope that India and Pakistan would assist
the international community in encouraging North Korea,
Iran, and other potential proliferators to adhere to their
international nonproliferation obligations.

More information on the Strategic Studies Institute’s
programs may be found on the Institute’s Homepage at
http://www.carlisle.army.mil/ssi/ or by calling (717) 2454212.
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